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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE -
THE INSURANCE SCENE
DUNBAR R. URTHOFF *
INTRODUCTION
iN California, only two insurance companies remain as
important writers of doctors' professional liability insur-
ance. In New York, one carrier steadfastly continues
to insure the vast majority of doctors. Nationally, few
companies are writing this insurance to any great extent.
So-called "Good Samaritan" laws,' currently receiving
increasing attention, symptomize the growing reluctance of
doctors to involve themselves in emergency situations with
their consequent exposure to claims or suits for malpractice.
Many high jury awards, some in excess of a million
dollars, seem to be less a measure of actual damages than
of public attitudes toward the medical world in general.
The doctor-and his insurer-feel that court action sup-
plies not justice, but exposure to whim or caprice.
In many states, limited availability of the insurance
protection so requisite to practice has nudged elderly phy-
sicians into retirement when they still have years of good
service to offer their communities. Others have retreated
into teaching or advisory medicine, or other fields of limited
exposure.
For years, discussions of the medical malpractice prob-
lem have featured such familiar culprit terms as "doctor
shortages," "social attitudes," "inflation," "medical complexi-
ties," "plaintiff legal practices," "decline of the traditional
doctor-patient relationship." Today, the developments de-
noted by those terms are blending into a disconcertingly
accelerating total force. The effect upon the medical com-
* Vice President and Actuary, Employers Insurance of Wausau.
1 A usual "Good Samaritan" law provides that if a doctor or nurse
stops to render assistance at an accident scene, he cannot be held negligent
for malpractice in his actions at that scene.
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munity of claims for alleged malpractice (or more often mis-
practice or nonpractice ") is simply getting out of hand,
with results described by informed observers as already
deleterious to medical progress, and of potentially disas-
trous impact in the future.
There is confusion within the medical profession. A
common variety of negligence, as a plain man understands
that word, used to be a fundamental requisite to a finding
of liability for damages, against either a doctor or anybody
else. New standards are being substituted-standards
whose measures and definitions vary from state to state,
court to court, and jury to jury. Nor are these measures
and definitions static, which would permit them to be
learned and used as guides. They continuously change,
even within single jurisdictions, and the changes are usually
toward even greater liberality, thus reflecting the changing
attitudes of our dynamic but increasingly permissive society.
All this operates as a restraint upon medical advance,
as a holdback upon proper and necessary experimentation
with drugs and therapies, as an inhibition on choice of
treatment. Doctors are inexorably impelled toward a safe
mediocrity.
There is both direct and indirect inflationary effect on
medical bills. The doctor "plays it safe" with tests, con-
sultations, and other defensive practices. Of course some
of this results in better diagnosis and care, and is thus a -
benefit to the patient, but some may be extraneous to the
actual case needs. And indirectly, in the long run the
patient picks up the whole malpractice cheek. Doctors,
like other business men, must pass their operating costs,
including insurance, along to their customers.
There is alarm as well as confusion. As insurance
companies find the medical malpractice exposure more com-
plex and difficult, more dangerous and more expensive to
underwrite, availability of insurance protection -"the mar-
ket"-becomes more and more severely limited. Fortun-
ately, a few of the more stable and resourceful carriers
2 EMPi.oYERs INSURANCE OF WAUSAU, MALPRAc-ncE INSURANCE IS Too
ExPENSIm 9 (1967) makes the distinction that "the majority of alleged
acts of malpractice are not 'mal-' at all"
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consider it their responsibility to find ways and means of
providing protection to the community whole. It is difficult
to visualize a medical profession deprived of access to the
insuring safeguards.
The confusion and alarm are justified. Pessimism is
not. As usually happens with the advent of general aware-
ness of a general threat, the very seriousness of the danger
generates corrective forces. The medical fraternity is dem-
onstrating increasing acceptance of the hypothesis that
doctors themselves possess the most effective potential rem-
edy. They are showing willingness to use that potential.
They are readily accepting suggestions born of case-by-case
statistical studies.3 They are applying new energies to the
problem in their medical societies--regional, state, and
national. They are concerning themselves with self-discip-
linary measures 4 and state disciplinary agencies. They are
redirecting their attention to the root causes of insurance
rates--the malpractices, real or alleged-rather than to the
insurance carrier, or to the premiums which ultimately
(often too late) must be only the result of losses arising
from such malpractices, real or alleged.'
But as doctors know better than anyone else, rehabili-
tation is apt to be a much slower process than onset. Our
problem patient can respond only slowly, and it would be
the height of complacency to expect a rapid cure. Actual
loss experience still fais to afford relief. The Insurance
Rating Board in New York, after approval by state insur-
ance regulatory authorities, recently promulgated notable
increases in rates in many states, and more are expected.
However, it is common knowledge that insurance carriers
have consistently lost money insuring the malpractice haz-
ard and the new rate increases have yet to prove any more
3 See "Case Studies" periodically issued by Employers Insurance of
Wausau, Dr. 0. Tod Mallery, Jr., Medical Director.
4 AMA News, October 28, 1968, at 12 where Dr. Robert B. Hunter,
in an address before the National Congress on Medical Ethics, declared:
"The public has a right to know, and the public has a right to the
assurance that a profession placed in such a high position . . . is acting
to cleanse itself, acting to discipline itself, and acting to raise the quality
of standards of practice in our country."5 See 1968 REPORT OF THE MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND DEFENSE BOARD
TO THE COUNCIL OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE STATE OF NEv YoRK.
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adequate to the steadily worsening pattern than increases
promulgated in the past. But without them, the relatively
few underwriters still hopefully in the field might be com-
pelled to leave it, or drastically curtail their commitment
to it.
While everybody-carriers and physicians alike-must
deplore the step-by-step escalation of rates, the steps must
be climbed until we reach a platform: a leveling-off place
from which we may hope to begin a descent. The steps
must lead either to such a platform, or to a jumping-off
place. One is reminded of David Balfour's fearsome mid-
night ascent of the winding stair outside his rascally
uncle's House of Shaws in Robert Louis Stevenson's Kid-
napped, when a timely lightning flash revealed the void
into which one more step would have plunged him. He
carefully withdrew his foot; cautiously descended whence
he had come. Let us hope that the growing medical aware-
ness will provide the platform that we need; the end to the
cost spiral-that neither doctors nor carriers will have to
choose between disaster and retreat.
THE TERm "MEDICAL MALPRACTICE"
Literally, "malpractice" means "bad .practice." But the
word "bad," with its moralistic overtones, doesn't contrib-
ute much at this point to an insurance-oriented discussion
(although further along we will glance at the "good-bad"
impression as one of those elusive and constantly changing
elements that can indeed be a factor in the difficulties of
providing a malpractice type of insurance).
For this conversation, we'll define "medical malprac-
tice" in lay (or jury) terms as an alleged medical act,
whether of commission or omission, offering a basis for an
injury claim upon which a specified monetary value is
placed by the complainant.
Later, we may have to distinguish between known or
identifiable acts of malpractice and those which must be
inferred from the circumstances or results. This distinction
often plays a part in "late reportings," which can be due
to deliberate or unnecessary delay on the part of the claim-
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ant, or to an extended interval between the alleged act of
malpractice and its first manifestation. We will distinguish
between "claims" and "suits," and between "awards" and
"settlements." But we shall avoid like a plague any pre-
tense of definition allied to merit in the ethical sense, a
concept on which the most enterprising legal authorities
fear to tread. When we talk about the merits of a case,
we refer to those recognized principles upon which one may
predict, with fair accuracy, that a court will indeed assign
to an alleged medical act some degree of malpractice lia-
bility.
WHAT IS "PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANC]E"?
All insurance can be divided into two categories. One
of them is loss or "first-party" insurance; the other is lia-
bility or "third-party" insurance. Loss insurance is of a
specific thing or quantity or asset, whether it be a man's
house or his life or a ship's cargo or a business' credit or
a woman's fur coat, against the perils described in the
policy. Liability insurance is protection against the legal
judgment or award which could be recovered from the
policyholder as a consequence of his injuring or wronging a
third person. Your bodily injury and property damage
coverages in your automobile policy are liability insurance;
the collision and comprehensive coverages in the same policy
are loss insurance.
Loss insurance is relatively simple. The traumatic
event for which a claim is made is usually plain to see;
the amount of the loss comparatively easy to measure.
Moreover, the perils covered by loss policies don't change
from place to place and from year to year as do the liability
perils. Fires and thefts, illnesses and deaths, are defined
today in pretty much the same terms as they were a hun-
dred years ago. It's very different with liability insurance.
For one thing, it revolves around the concept of fault,
which has resisted definition since the days of Solon. For
another, the injury or wrong for which recovery is sought
is often much harder to translate into dollars; nobody has
ever invented a reliable money yardstick for pain and suf-
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fering. For still a third, our liability concepts change with
changing technologies, the advent of new forces, the devel-
opment of new behavior patterns. New liabilities can be
instantly created by legislatures or by supreme courts.
Professional liability insurance, of which medical mal-
practice insurance is an example, is a highly specialized
form of protection. A "professional" is a person represent-
ing himself to be particularly trained and qualified in the
techniques, disciplines, and literatures of a special calling.
By the mere act of assuming and publishing his label, he
claims expertise in his line. "Professionals" are expected
by the public to be less prone to error than ordinary people,
and this expectation is backed by the force of law.
An insured doctor's malpractice policy provides, with
respect to the professional acts or omissions defined in the
policy, that in consideration of a specified premium for a
specified term the carrier will protect the doctor against
any suit or claim alleging injury or death, and on account
of which damages are sought. This protection includes the
furnishing of legal defense and indemnification, to the
limits of the policy, against any recovery made.
Is DocToRs' PROFESSIONAL LIABILIY POPERLY INSURABLE?
It is not within the province of this paper to explore
the doctrines of law, or provide the case-by-case examples,
underlying the fantastic variations of degrees of fault or
negligence which characterize medical malpractice concepts.
It is important, though, that the existence of these extremes
be understood if one is to comprehend their result-that the
market available to the insuring doctor is highly volatile,
and presently very limited.
In fact, there has been so kaleidoscopic an activity of
ventures into, and exits (often hasty) from the malprac-
tice field by many insurance carriers that one might ask
the fundamental question: is the medical liability exposure
a proper subject for insurance at all?
Given our existing socio-economic capsule, the answer
has to be yes if the insurance profession is to do its whole
duty-not just to doctors, but to the public. Only very
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rash or very wealthy physicians would dare pursue active
medical practice with no means of sharing their liability
exposures. Society cannot dispense with its doctors; the
doctors cannot dispense with indemnity protection, and
under our prevailing structure, insurance is their only
source for it.
Insurability is determined by several tests. Let's apply
them to the medical practice exposures:
1. The event or condition insured against must be fortuitous. At
first blush, there would seem to be no question but that any act
of medical malpractice must be fortuitous. It would certainly not
be premeditated or intended by the doctor.
But the doctor is not the only party to the question of fortuity.
The patient, even though unlikely to desire a bad result or delib-
erately injure himself, can nevertheless do either or both of two
things that may bring about a malpractice claim. First, he can
construct an event or physical condition that may lend credence to
such a claim. Second, he can construe an event or a condition to
be malpractice.
This may involve actual fraud or an element of it, such as
often attends feigned injuries in an auto accident. But in malprac-
tice actions, much more frequently than in auto cases, the plaintiff
is not so much consciously dishonest as a victim of self-deception
or self-pity.
As the patient may have influence upon the way a medical act
may be constructed or construed, a court and jury-which after all
is just a collection of patients or potential patients--expresses in-
nate personal desires and prejudices in their interpretations and
judgments. The judge and the jurors are only steps in time
removed from the plaintiff's position they are expected to pass upon
impartially.
It is not altogether easy, therefore, to say that the criterion of
fortuity is fully met. Too many personal influences are possible.
2. The insurance contract must have a "functional worth" coin-
mensurate with the work and expense of distributing losses among
the insuring community. This "worth" may be measured by the
difference between a) the premium per insurer and b) the poten-
tial loss if not insured. For example, if a dental service policy
costs $100 to insure against $500 aggregate dental costs, there is
much less functional worth than attaches to a "basic limit" mal-
practice policy costing $50 and providing up to $5000 per claim
and $15,000 total coverage. The basic limit policy, in turn, is of
 VOL. 43
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less worth than a policy costing $100 and providing limits of
$100,000 per claim and $300,000 total aggregate.6
We may conclude that medical malpractice insurance contracts
notably satisfy the "functional worth" criterion.
3. The event or condition insured against must be sufficiently
definable to initiate, with reasonably little question, the operation
of the insuring agreement. For example, it is possible to insure
against bad weather. But the kind and degree of the "badness,"
to be truly insurable, must be stipulated in terms of calendar, dura-
tion, and instrument readings at specified times and places.
Again, as with the fortuity criterion, no ideally precise defini-
tion of an act of malpractice is available in advance. It must
emerge ultimately through due process. Of course we lack defini-
tive language for every shade of error insured against under most
liability contracts. But the vast majority of events which give rise
to other-than-malpractice liability actions have sudden or traumatic
or otherwise obvious characteristics. The happening is plain; the
questions deal mostly with pricing the damage done.
With many malpractice cases, the policy provisions have to be
interpreted de novo and continuously as the case evolves. What
must be assessed is the community's current attitude, and whether
it will translate to a degree of malpractice in terms of that par-
ticular case. It may be of little or no ivalue as a guide to the
handling of the next similar case that comes along. One might
paraphrase the defense and indemnification provisions of the policy
as: "The company agrees to participate in the legal processes of
defining the nature and extent of the malpractice, if any, and the
amount of damages appropriate thereto."
The failure of malpractice insurance to satisfy this criterion of
definability is a major element in our problem. When we reflect
on the speed with which public attitudes are changing, and the
direction the changes are taking, and the vulnerability of the mal-
practice policy to these attitudes, it is not hard to understand how
the malpractice exposure can strike fear into the hearts of insur-
ance underwriters accustomed to firmer ground. Hence the steadily
adverse relationship between losses and premiums, and the resultant
narrowing of the "market."
4. The group insured, and its exposures, must be wide enough and
deep enough to provide adequate "spread." Obviously, there are
enough doctors in the country for loss spreading and to permit the
6 Reference to the schedule of rates shown in the Appendix will reveal
the surprisingly small additional premiums necessary to provide very high
and almost certainly adequate limits of coverage. A $100,000 per claim
limit costs about twice the premium for a $5,000 per claim policy; a$1,000,000 per claim policy costs only slightly more-about 2% times
the basic $5,000 coverage.
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law of large numbers to operate. But in practice, our insured
doctor "group" does not include all the doctors in the country.
There are many communities of insureds, segregated by state and
by company, and many of the units are very small. We cannot
say that our candidate for malpractice satisfies this requirement of
size.
In summary, then, regarding theoretical insurability,
most of the commonly-accepted criteria are met barely or
not at all. An insurer can expect trouble in its attempts
to handle this line of insurance. A continued build-up of
spread and of experience is mandatory, and carriers who
have failed to accumulate them have been badly burned.
Many underwriters have withdrawn, some without real com-
prehension of the basic difficulties which might have been
revealed by an analysis like the foregoing.
THn INSURANCE COST PROBLIwM FROM THE DOCTOR's VIEW 7
In 1950, the average premium per insured doctor in
New York was $75. In 1967 it was $324, an increase of
332 per cent or well over four times the 1950 figure. Both
frequency and severity of loss have increased, and the
worsening of these two loss factors has produced a third
element of cost-the need for higher limits at increased
premiums. In 1950 a $100,000 limit expressed unusual
prudence; today over 90 per cent of doctors buy at least
that much coverage; three-quarters of them buy $200,000
or more, and limits of $1 million or higher are no longer
rarities.
It can be argued that the 332 per cent increase cited
ought to be discounted by that part of the boost that has
purchased higher limits, and if we do this the increase be-
comes 102 per cent. But the lower limits were generally
adequate to the doctor's needs in 1950, while the higher
7Rates cited and discussed are those used in the State of New York
by Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin. See
Appendix for current rate schedule and note increase from 1967 to 1968
in the Metropolitan area. This Wisconsin Company initiated its program
with the New York Medical Society July 1, 1949, hence the 17-year com-
parison of the average premium of the first full year, 1950 to the latest
completed year, 1967.
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limits were required in 1967. As a measure of what a
doctor must spend to protect himself, the figure of 332 per
cent gives the truer picture.
Parenthetically, let's note a few other cost indices.
Between 1950 and 1967, the period we are dealing with,
the value of the gross national product increased 170 per
cent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index
increased 36 per cent. The New York Stock Exchange
composite price index increased 376 per cent; the Bureau
of Labor Statistics average weekly gross earnings in manu-
facturing 97 per cent; physicians' fees 81 per cent; hospital
charges 246 per cent; average income 117 per cent.3
THE INSURANCE COST PROBIEM FROM THE INSURANCE
COMPANY VIEWPOINT 9
Simply stated, losses have been increasing faster than
premium rates. Specifically, while premiums increased 332
per cent, the loss increase has been approximately 375 per
cent.
Because premium rates are set up by deliberate calcula-
tions and step by step, carrier managements and actuaries
might be asked why the loss trends have not been ade-
quately anticipated. There are several answers. The pri-
mary basis for future rates is past losses, but in this case
the unprecedented magnitude and acceleration of the loss
movement has deprived the past experience of credibility.
The difficulty of loss valuation has been compounded by
the extended delays-unique to malpractice insurance-
between the alleged act, our first notice of it, and ultimate
trial or other disposition, during which inflation and lib-
eralizing attitudes play a significant part. In New York,
there is a notable surge of first notices by malpractice
claimants just before the running-out of the three-year stat-
ute of limitations. It is not easy to make proper investi-
8 For a convenient source of these and other indices, and their relation
to expected average liability claim costs, see Masterson, Economic Factors
in Liability and Property Itsurance Claims Costs 1935-1967, 55 PROCEEDINGS
OF CAsuA vr ACrUARiAL SocIErv 1 (1968).
9 The viewpoint of Employers Insurance of Wausau.
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gations of claims two or three years old when we first
learn of them. Crowded court calendars add still further
to the lapse of time between first valuation of the loss and
its final determination, if the case must actually be tried.
Perhaps even this combination of difficulties would not
excuse the insurance managements and actuaries for con-
sistently drifting below the accelerating cost target. But
there are still other factors. The state rate-regulating au-
thorities are an inhibiting influence. So are doctors them-
selves, who are often reluctant to believe that the situation
can be as bad as pictured. Finally, an important reason
for premium failure springs from within the insurance
industry itself. Competitive price cutting is nurtured by
failings of less experienced underwriters to adequately
measure losses currently being incurred but for which true
valuations require lengthy seasonings of maturity. While
it is true that the statutory loss reserving formula of an
insurance company's annual reportings to regulatory au-
thorities is intended to guard against optimistic under-
valuations, experiences have shown this to be inadequate
for many companies.10
The element of trusteeship is prominent in malpractice
insurance. The receipt of premiums involves the insurer
in a long-term distribution arrangement, as liabilities may
appear, on behalf of all of its insuring doctors. Because
the premiums have not been even remotely adequate, the
carriers have had to use funds earned from other sources
to fulfill the liability obligations incurred in their malprac-
tice writings. Often this necessity has not been realistically
determined until optimism has led to multiplying outstand-
ing malpractice policies, which have then been dropped in
a panicky wave of cancellations. The sudden distress mar-
10 The Schedule P of the casualty company annual statement blank
requires a minimum estimate, for the last three policy years, that incurred
losses and loss adjustment expenses shall be 60 percent of premiums. Ad-
herence to such a loss ratio, in setting up reserves for losses and the atten-
dant adjustment expenses, could be reasonably defined as foolish optimism,
in light of more recent malpractice underwriting results. Until premium
rate increases can be accelerated more rapidly to overtake loss acceleration,
a 100 percent ratio would be safer, which would of course leave no part of
premiums for the considerable expenses of policy issue, taxes, etc.
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ket thus created exerts further strain on the carriers who
are still trying to stay alive in the malpractice field.
In its 1967 report to the Council of the Medical Society
of the State of New York, the Malpractice Insurance and
Defense Board particularly noted the rapid latter-year in-
creases in loss costs:
The following comparison of the cost of closed cases during the
past few years illustrates the marked trend toward higher disposal
costs. These figures are the result of dividing the total cost of all
closed cases during the year shown by the number of suits plus
the number of claims settled, eliminating reported events that did
not develop into suits or claims, as well as claims closed with no





The simplest reason why closing costs have increased is inflation.
A survey of suits closed in 1966 shows that the policy year when
the alleged malpractice occurred preceded the year of closing by
an average of over five years. This means that premium rates, if
they are to be adequate, must take into account future inflation,
which it is generally conceded will amount to from three to five
percent a year, provided it is kept within "acceptable" limits.
In addition to payments for pain and suffering and for wage
loss, both of which are increased by inflation, a settlement or a jury
verdict includes the cost of doctor and hospital bills, whether or
not these have been paid by the plaintiff. These costs too are
subject to inflation. An article in the AMA News of March 20,
1967, states that hospital daily charges during 1966 increased 16.5
percent and that the average annual increase from 1950 to 1965
was 5.8 percent.
That quotation from the Society Board report offers
a fine example of how doctors more recently are identifying
with insurers in their views of the cost problem. It shows
awareness that interests and objectives must indeed be
similar in the search for solutions to the malpractice
problem.
A BASIC INSURANCE RATI1IAKTNG ANALOGY
To doctors, insurance specialists are laymen. To an
actuary, it's the doctor who is the layman. It is vital to
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the purposes of this article that its readers be acquainted
with the bare bones of ratemaking. Let's see if we can
accomplish this by a simple analogy.
If a non-crooked coin is properly flipped by a non-
crooked flipper, we have a fair subject for a fifty-fifty bet.
Now, let's suppose a doctor has a nightmare in which he is
compelled to toss a coin five times. If all five tosses turn
up tails, he must pay $10,000 to a disgruntled patient.
This, we further assume, composes his malpractice exposure.
Rather than accept this risk himself, he asks a pro-
fessional taker of chances-an insurance company-what
premium it would charge to take the risk, leaving the doc-
tor simply to enjoy watching the five tosses, and also dream
pleasantly about practicing medicine. What should the
premium be?
Mathematically, the chance of seeing five tails is one-
half raised to the fifth power ( multiplied by 1/2 five
times). This works out to a probability of seeing it happen
once per 32 trials of five tosses each. By payment of
$10,000 divided by 32, or $312.50, our doctor friend may
transfer his risk to the entrepreneur (who .presumably is
collecting a lot of these premiums, while occasionally suffer-
ing the $10,000 loss).
The risk-taker is not depending on luck, which might
be good or bad if his business is small and vulnerable to
purely chance fluctuations. He depends upon spread and
enough volume to assure smooth operation of the law of
large numbers. He is not in the game just for sport either,
so he may be expected to load his $312.50 premium for
expenses, taxes, and a livelihood, plus a small contingency
for things somehow not coming out right. If we lump all
this expense loading at 20 percent, the final premium would
be $390. This would leave $312 (80 percent of $390)
for loss payments.
So far we have the elements of an insuring agree-
ment-the calculated expectation of loss and expense, and
its assumption for commendable reasons by someone in
that kind of business. But now one more step, if you
please. The coin, alas, is of strange vintage, or affected
by unexpected and malign influences of some sort. The
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five-tail ogre keeps popping up once in every 30 trials
of five tosses each, instead of the expected once in 32.
Another misfortune, inflation, forces the risk-assumer to
use an average of $11,000 to satisfy each original $10,000
obligation. The doctor sleeps at ease; the nightmare has
passed to his insurer.
Fortunately, the insurer has surplus adequate to permit
him to stay with the game while he seeks to correct the
odds. Now actual experience comes into play. If no
further new malfunctions are expected, the arithmetic is
easy. The 390 rate is increased to accommodate the
frequency and cost data compiled so far, and becomes
.$457. That figure continues the 20 percent premium
expense loading. If the loss platform has been reached,
it should be adequate, since taxes, commissions, etc., are
usually in terms of fixed premium percentages and there-
fore direct functions of premium, and other expenses tend
to move parallel to the economy.
Thus far, however, our risk-taking friend has lost
money-about 17 percent of the $312 per doctor intended
to be used for the $10,000-type payments. In other words,
he had a $53 underwriting loss per doctor. Now he has
several options. He can decide that doctors are bad
medicine, and try his luck elsewhere. Or he can attempt
to select particular doctors who he believes have been, or
are likely to be, blessed with better fortune as coin-
flippers. Or he can bravely tighten his belt, flourish his
slide rule, and bend his prophetic skills to the task of
finding odds that will allow him to continue to serve a
whole medical community-perhaps fortified in his resolve
by the man who said most things better than anybody
else:
There is a history in all men's lives,
Figuring the nature of the times deceas'd,
The which observed, a man may prophesy,
With a near aim, of the main chance of things
As yet not come to life, which in their seeds
And weak beginnings, lie intreasured.
(King Henry IV, Part II)
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DOMOTRS ARE DIFFERENT, ONE FROM ANOTHER
This seems an elementary proposition. But reference
to the schedule of rates used in New York State by a leading
carrier in the establishment of classification rate difference
(see Appendix) shows that the implementation of this
axiom produces wide variations.
When one doctor's exposure to loss is shown by statis-
tically fortified premium rates to be ten times that of
another's, the potential for disaster to an insurance com-
pany pursuing or accepting inadequately classified and
rated segments of the doctor population is apparent. Un-
sophisticated and segmented underwriting is likely to re-
sult in misfortune and withdrawal from the market.
In 1955, a carrier with little or no previous experience
in writing medical professional liability entered a surgical
segment, usually categorized as most difficult. The early
known experience appeared to justify optimism and a small
dividend was begun. Eight years later, as the true loss
picture emerged, the company withdrew from the mal-
practice field entirely-though it is undoubtedly still in-
dexing new claims and coping with inflation in the handling
of old ones.
Only a company with considerable volume can have
adequate statistics, discernment, and administrative judg-
ment for effective doctor-by-doctor rating.
Until 1958, in New York there were no established
methods for classifying doctors by specialty and practice,
so no rate differentials were employed. The first classi-
fication system, initiated in 1958, was simple: surgeons
and physicians. Because proper class rating requires
assignment by specialty and practice, it then became pos-
sible to begin organization of a statistical system for
accumulation of loss experience by such categories. This
was begun with policies issued in 1958, and is now a
valuable instrument for equitable distribution of insur-
ance costs among doctors.
Although statistical experiences are actually main-
tained for all of the many segments of specialties and
counties (a total of close to ten thousand possible com-
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binations) it should not be thought that each of these
segments independently determines its own rate. In many
segments the volume-even though accumulated for many
years-is not adequate to serve as a reliable sample. Im-
proper reliance could produce improper separate rates.
Instead, observation first of frequencies for specialty groups
and second of average case costs (when larger volumes
are available), as well as medically informed judgment,
lead to grouping into fewer rate classifications. These
rate classes receive their relativity treatments in turn, with
the final step being a merging into an overall required
rate level based on broader calculations.
Territorial differences also receive the relativity-type
treatment. In the September 1, 1968 rates (see Appendix),
territorial relativities can be expressed approximately as
follows, placing an index of 1.00 upon the Metropolitan
rate level:
Suburban I (Orange and Westchester Counties), 80 percent of
Metropolitan rates; Suburban II (Rockland, Suffolk, Sullivan
and Ulster Counties), 110 percent of Metropolitan; Upstate
(all other counties), 60 percent of Metropolitan.
CrASsIiGAT Io U NDRWRITING
One of the curious aspects of the tightening market
can be a particular carrier's abrupt withdrawal from a
classification of doctors as though they had suddenly
become toxic. This kind of selective action leaves de-
plorable connotations about underwriting ability or judg-
ment.
Only through many years accumulation of class statis-
tics can there be sound bases for distinctive rates or class
grouping underwriting selections. Few insurance carriers
write enough volume for enough years to have these
bases. Of those that do, the responsible carrier should
first take the obvious action of adjusting rates accordingly.
Smaller companies with more limited volume don't have
to rely on their own experience--which, as we have seen,
can get them into trouble with further deterioration of
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the overall market. They can follow the larger carriers'
rate differences, or several of them can combine to pool
their experience data."
For example, anesthesiologists seem to have been
picked on by some companies as a poor risk group. There
seems to have been a grapevine route for on-the-street
word that underwriters should be very careful about these
doctors. Some carriers stopped writing them altogether-
a disturbing market influence. Actually, this group's statis-
tics are no worse, relative to going premium rate levels
and to the practical avenues for correction, than the
doctor average. There is an element of high frequency
which may have triggered underwriting avoidance-be-
cause it was not considered in conjunction with a lower
average case severity. This demonstrates the need for both
full and credible statistics and for more careful analysis
before precipitate action.
The market is becoming concentrated among a relatively
few skillful underwriters. Although many insurance com-
panies have medical malpractice policies in force, the
major volume is underwritten by a handful. A few car-
riers have traditionally specialized in writing insurance
for individual doctors, but the high-volume companies deal
mostly with whole societies or through specialty-group
franchise arrangements.
The group approach offers the single advantage, to
both parties, of a full and intelligent partnership between
insurer and insured. In the last analysis, it is for doctors,
not their insurance carriers, to control their insurance
costs. Medical societies contribute a great deal to the
partnership that individual doctors could not be expected
to provide. They organize prevention activities; they
"'Through Act of March 9, 1945, ch. 20 §3, 59 Stat. 34, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1964), Congress made it possible for certain insurers,
through duly licensed rating bureaus and under state-by-state regulatory
provisions, to combine experiences according to the principle that larger
statistical volumes permit more dependable application of Bernoulli's Law
of large numbers, which may be phrased as a practical matter as follows:
The greater the number of exposures, the more closely the actual results
obtained will approach the probable result which would be expected with an
infinite number of exposures.
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establish expert committees to review alleged malpractices;
they assist their carriers in the formulation of rates for
doctors offering 'special or unusual exposures. This kind
of effort goes a long way toward keeping the whole group
"insurable" in spite of the doubts discussed in our section
on theoretical insurability.
AILTERNATIVE COST-REDUCING DEVIcEs
In the long run, we believe that the only way to
reduce the costs of medical malpractice insurance is to
reduce the frequency and severity of medical malpractice
claims. We also believe that the only way to reduce auto
insurance costs is to stanch the flow of blood on our high-
ways. But just as auto owners continue to seek some
way of having accidents without paying for them, many
doctors quite understandably continue to search for escape
from onerous malpractice premiums by some route other
than avoiding claims and suits. Let's look at some of
them:
1. Deductibles. A deductible feature in his malpractice policy
requires the doctor to contribute a specified sum to the
award or settlement. In return, the premium is reduced.
Some carriers use deductibles primarily as a device for
reducing their own loss payments, with little or no premium
reduction. Some approximate calculations will indicate the
relatively small savings of average deductibles:
$ 500 deductible Reduction: 3 per cent
1000 deductible Reduction: 6 per cent
2000 deductible Reduction: 10 per cent
5000 deductible Reduction: 20 per cent
Thus a premium of $1,000 would drop to $800 in return for
the doctor's agreement to pay up to the first $5,000 toward
disposition of any one malpractice claim or suit. These are
not likely ever to be widely attractive. Delays, often of years,
before trial or settlement, leave the amount of contribution
uncertain; the premium reduction is not too significant; loss
settlements become issues of potential disagreement between
insured and insurer.
2. Assigned Risk Plans. These don't operate to reduce premium;
on the contrary, they are more likely to elevate it. Their
purpose is only to make the insurance available. They would
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probably operate on a state, society, or group basis. Under
such a plan, any doctor who could 'show that he had been
refused by a specified number of insurance companies would
be assigned to a carrier who would have to provide him
with at least a designated minimum of protection. At present
there are special "rating-up" arrangements in many states,
by which doctors presenting unusually high exposures may
buy insurance. It is still quite rare-and we hope the rarity
continues-for a properly eligible physician to be unable to buy
insurance. There is a danger that an assigned risk plan may
force ordinary doctors to share the insurance cost burden
imposed by the experience of doctors who are careless, or
whose practice or specialties by their nature provoke a high
degree of frequency or severity of malpractice claims. But
if there were adequate disciplinary procedures, an assigned
risk plan could be helpful.
3. Doctor-owned imurance companies. It is inevitable that any
definable group with insurance problems, whether of high
rates, ailing market, or something else, will ponder the do-
it-yourself insurance company. This has been done success-
fully, but not in circumstances analagous to those of the
American doctor today. The American College of Surgeons
tried it and failed a few years ago. The California Medical
Association recently ruled against it. Other Societies have
considered it, but have been deterred by these difficulties:
(a) The loss possibilities require a tremendous investment in
.capital and surplus, the continuous handling of which would
be a major project in itself.
(b) The captive company would have to be assured of participation
by the great majority of individual members of the organizing
group. It was this hurdle that defeated the movement in
the California Medical Association; their 1967 poll disclosed
that 41 per cent of their doctors did not think premium rates
were excessive, and only 3.9 per cent thought the Association
should provide them with insurance.1
2
3.21968 REPORT BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CALIFORNIA MEDIcAL AssOcIrATION
has these conclusions drawn from their study of the physician-owned
company: It is the inescapable and unalterable conclusion of this study that
the formation of a physician-owned or controlled malpractice insurance
carrier by CMA would not be in the best interest of either the phy-
sicians or the public.
It is further concluded that the recent action of the carriers in
California are not causes of the malpractice problem.
Therefore, the formation of a new, additional carrier would not
solve any problems; but rather, would create new, additional problems.
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(c) Many highly-specialized skills and disciplines are essential
to the delivery and service of malpractice insurance-pre-
vention activities, claims investigation, legal, underwriting,
actuarial, and others. Experienced personnel with these
skills are in short supply; a new company is unlikely to
attract and hold them without difficult and expensive timing
problems. The capital investment would have to be sup-
ported by rapid premium growth, but because reporting
of claims and suits lags much further behind premiums in
malpractice than in other insurance areas, 13 the highly-skilled
(and highly-paid) claims-legal staff could neither be dispensed
with nor used to anything like its full potential for a long
time, perhaps for years.
(d) The underlying problem leading to the organization of a
"captive" company-adverse loss ratios and consequently ris-
ing costs-are not likely to be any less severe for a new
company, or easier to solve, than for those already in the
business. Lacking some drastically new and effective ap-
proach, the newcomer would be, if anything, more vulnerable
to danger than the experienced carriers, who themselves are
having to rationalize their continued presence in the market
with at least a smattering of altruism.
One final penetrating thought emerges: If a com-
munity of doctors is well enough organized to think and
act, effectively and together, about all the details involved
in organizing and administering an insurance company,
they are already in excellent position to seek a better
alternative. Good doctor organization is the first pre-<__
requisite to soliciting assistance from a well-organized,'-
well-financed, and experienced professional carrier to un-
derwrite a group or society program. Such a program
It is further concluded that the formation of a physician-owned or
controlled malpractice insurance carrier would be so detrimental to the
best interests of both the physician and the patient that the medical
profession might never recover from its devastating effects. A.M.A.
News, Nov. 18, 1968, at 15.
"3New York loss reportings show these incidences: Only 26 percent of
losses are known by the end of the same calendar year in which they are
incurred. After two years, 40 percent of the losses have not yet been
reported to the insurance company. These losses will trickle in as the years
go on, some not being reported for eight years or longer after they are
incurred. These late reporting figures may be expected to vary, more or
less, by types of exposures, such as surgery versus general practice exclud-
ing surgery.
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offers all of the potential of a doctor-owned company,
with fewer of the hazards:
1. Coverages are tailored to both groups and individual needs.
2. The group experience ultimately determines the rates.
3. Loss settlement and defense practices can, to a substantial
degree, defer to the desires of the group.
4. Advisory and prevention efforts are coordinated between the
doctors and the company, with maximized effectiveness.
5. The doctors can assist with underwriting, and with the
disciplinary selections so important to either a group program
or a specialty company.
INEASED RATE LEvELs
As noted, premium rates have recently been raised
substantially in most states, including New York. As also
noted, however distasteful this remedy, it is both sensible
and necessary. However, like many remedies this one
may be attended by unfortunate side-effects. The increases
may encourage some carriers with marginal malpractice
experience and underwriting skills to enter (or return to)
the market. This in turn could reduce the pressure
to pursue true and long-lasting solutions.
These pressures, upon all the parties concerned-the
doctors, the companies, the public-have become very
strong. Attitudes are changing, complacencies are dis-
appearing, organized action is on the horizon. It would
be unfortunate if this impetus were lost, even though the
impetus is itself produced by misfortunes:
Sweet are the uses of adversity
Which like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.
(As You Like It)
LEGISLATION?
In a special report in the AMA News for November
18, 1968, there are some comparisons between the medical
malpractice scene in Canada and that in the United States.
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Canadian doctors pay 25 a year for what amounts to
defense insurance, rather than indemnity against damages.
Very few cases are settled, or lost in the courts. The
Canadian doctor is not "fair game" either to the public
or to lawyers. Attorneys cannot accept cases on a con-
tingent basis, and they have been known to tell a claimant
"You haven't got a case, and I won't take it." Other
Canadian features-the rules of negligence and of evidence,
trial usually by judge without jury-are also unfavorable
to a litigious climate.
It's tempting to ask "Why can't it be like that here?"
But the United States can't legislate itself back to its
old days of amicable coexistence between patients, doctors,
lawyers, and the judging public-the conditions that still
prevail in Canada. Some safeguards might be legislated,
though at the risk of yet further deterioration of the
medical public image, which has already been identified
as one of the root causes of our problems. But legislation
cannot be looked to for substantial or permanent solutions.
Like the policeman in The Pirates of Penzance (or
like the goalie in a hockey game) the malpractice in-
surance underwriter may complain that his lot is not a
happy one. But if he belongs in his job, he'll keep work-
ing at the malpractice problem, not retreating from it.
Ile and his company will continue to press for general
awareness that:
1. There must be many kinds of malpractice prevention.
2. There must be self-discipline by the medical fraternity by
which improper hazards may be dislodged, paving the way
for effective underwriting and rating.
3. There must be expert medical assistance available to the
defending doctor.
4. There must be understanding, by the public, of its role
of patient as well as jury, and of the harm redounding
to it as patient if it misplays its part as plaintiff and
jury.
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5. There must be understanding by the legal profession of
its role of public defender, in which it owes a duty to
the doctor who is also a public defender, and that to fail
in this duty is to fail in its duty to us all.
APPENDIX
RATES AND INFORMATION
Effective for Policies Dating on and after September 1, 1968
Limit No. 1 is the limit of liability for loss resulting from any one
claim or suit or all claims or suits because of injury to or death of any
one person and Limit No. 2 is the total limit of liability on account of all
acts or omissions occurring in any policy period.
METROPOLITAN AREA
(The five counties of New York City and Nassau County)
Limit Limit Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class
No. 1 No. 2 1A 1B 1 2 3 4 5 6
$ 25,000/ 75,000 $1,350 $1,023 $ 986 $627 $514 $296 $206 $132
50,000/ 150,000 1,488 1,127 1,086 691 566 326 227 146
100,000/ 300,000 1,542 1,168 1,126 716 587 338 235 151
200,000/ 600,000 1,565 1,185 1,142 726 596 343 239 153
300,000/ 900,000 1,595 1,208 1,165 740 607 349 243 156
500,000/1,500,000 1,634 1,238 1,193 758 622 358 249 160
1,000,000/1,500,000 1,741 1,319 1,271 808 663 381 266 170




Limit Limit X-Ray and/or Isotope Electroshock






















Rates for physicians employed full time by the Federal Government (but
not in military service) are 251 less than those quoted above.
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RATES AND INFORMATION
Effective for Policies Dating on and after September 1, 1967
Limit No. 1 is the limit of liability for loss resulting from any one
claim or suit or all claims or suits because of injury to or death of any
one person and Limit No. 2 is the total limit of liability on account of all
acts or omissions occurring in any policy period.
METROPOLITAN AREA
(The five counties of New York City and Nassau County)
Limit Limit Class Class Class Class Class Class Class
No. 1 No. 2 1A 1 2 3 4 5 6
$ 25,000/ 75,000 $1,023 $ 901 $539 $442 $260 $190 $125
50,000/ 150,000 1,127 993 594 487 287 210 138
100,000/ 300,000 1,168 1,029 615 505 297 217 143
200,000/ 600,000 1,185 1,044 624 512 302 220 145
300,000/ 900,000 1,208 1,065 636 522 308 225 148
500,000/1,500,000 1,238 1,091 652 535 315 230 151
1,000,000/1,500,000 1,319 1,162 695 570 336 245 161




Limit Limit X-Ray and/or Isotope Electroshock
No. 1 No. 2 Therapy Teletherapy Therapy













Rates for physicians employed full time by the Federal Government (but
not in military service) are 257o less than those quoted above.
RATES AND INFORMATION
Effective for Policies Dating on and after September 1, 1968
Limit No. 1 is the limit of liability for loss resulting from any one
claim or suit or all claims or suits because of injury to or death of any
one person and Limit No. 2 is the total limit of liability on account of all
acts or omissions occurring in any policy period.
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UPSTATE AREA
(All Counties except New York City, Nassau, Westchester, Suffolk,
Orange, Rockland, Sullivan and Ulster)
Limit Limit Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class
No. 1 No. 2 1A 1B 1 2 3 4 5 6
$ 25,000/ 75,000 $664 $540 $426 $269 $227 $127 $ 90 $62
50,000/ 150,000 731 596 469 297 250 140 99 68
100,000/ 300,000 758 617 486 308 259 145 103 70
200,000/ 600,000 769 626 494 312 263 147 104 71
300,000/ 900,000 784 639 503 318 268 150 106 73
500,000/1,500,000 803 654 515 326 275 153 109 75
1,000,000/1,500,000 856 697 549 347 293 163 116 79




Limit Limit X-Ray and/or Isotope Electroshock
No. 1 No. 2 Therapy Teletherapy Therapy













Rates for physicians employed full time by the Federal Government (but
not in military service) are 25% less than those quoted above.
RATES AND INFORMATION
Effective for Policies Dating on and after September 1, 1968
Limit No. 1 is the limit of liability for loss resulting from any one
claim or suit or all claims or suits because of injury to or death of any
one person and Limit No. 2 is the total limit of liability on account of all
acts or omissions occurring in any policy period.
SUBURBAN AREA I
(Westchester and Orange Counties)
Limit Limit Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class
No. 1 No. 2 1A 1B 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Additional premiums required if the following procedures are to be covered.
Limit Linit























Rates for physicians employed full time by the Federal Government (but
not in military service) are 25% less than those quoted above.
RATES AND INFORMATION
Effective for Policies Dating on and after September 1, 1968
Limit No. 1 is the limit of liability for loss resulting from any one
claim or suit or all claims or suits because of injury to or death of any
one person and Limit No. 2 is the total limit of liability on account of all
acts or omissions occurring in any policy period.
SUBURBAN AREA II
(Suffolk, Rockland, Sullivan and Ulster Counties)
Limit Limit Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class
No. 1 No. 2 1A 1B 1 2 3 4 5 6
$ 25,000/ 75,000 $1,243 $1,023 $ 986 $627 $514 $296 $206 $132
50,000/ 150,000 1,370 1,127 1,086 691 566 326 227 146
100,000/ 300,000 1,419 1,168 1,126 716 587 338 235 151
200,000/ 600,000 1,440 1,185 1,142 726 596 343 239 153
300,000/ 900,000 1,468 1,208 1,165 740 607 349 243 156
500,000/1,500,000 1,504 1,238 1,193 758 622 358 249 160
1,000,000/1,500,000 1,603 1,319 1,271 808 663 381 266 170




Limit Limit X-Ray andlor Isotope Electroshock
No. 1 No. 2 Therapy Teletherapy Therapy
$ 25,0 0/ 75,000 $56 $ 92 $53
50,000/ 150,000 62 101 58
100,000/ 300,000 64 105 60
200,000/ 600,000 65 106 61
300,000/ 900,000 67 108 62
500,000/1,500,000 68 111 64
1,000,000/1,500,000 73 118 68
Rates for physicians employed full time by the Federal Government (but
not in military service) are 25%7 less than those quoted above.
Electroshock
Therapy
$53
58
60
61
62
64
68
